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Macro-Prudential Regulation and Effective
Monetary Policy
Moses K. Tule*

I.

Introduction

T

he recent global financial and economic crisis exposed the fragilities, risks,
interconnectedness, and structural rigidities inherent in domestic financial
systems and how these can impact on global financial stability. The crisis also
highlighted the inadequacies of the price stability objective and micro-prudential
regulation in guaranteeing a healthy financial system, and the fac t that regulators
must worry about the systemic issues underlying the stability of the financial system.
As a result, excessive leverages leading to build-up of financial imbalances provided
a barometer for measuring financial instability. Financial deepening, complex
innovative financial instruments and the integration of markets created the ease of
financial contagion in fragile economies across borders to economies with overtly
strong financial markets and economic fundamentals.
In the build-up to the recent global financial and economic crisis, anecdotal
evidence suggests that poor monetary policy, complemented by a reliance on
micro-prudential supervision could lead to a crisis of enormous dimensions, unless
checked by more encompassing complementary policies. The set of these
complementary policies, developed following the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
provided the rationale for rethinking micro-prudential supervision as a pragmatic
framework for financial stability, especially within a globalized financial system. Thus,
Crockett (2000) reasoned that micro-prudential supervision, which hitherto, had been
traditionally directed to protect depositors and investors, could be redesigned
towards maintaining financial stability by "marrying the micro and macro- prudential
dimensions o f financial stability" . Following this, the World Bank in a series of seminar
papers examined the viability of macro-prudential regulation in ensuring financial
stability. The solution toolkit of the recent global financial crisis enveloped macroprudential policy as forming the nucleus in discussions on the assessment o f health
and safety of the financial system as well as the prevention of future crises.
Consequently, the IMF programme for the assessment of systemic financial stability
now relies more on macro-prudential policy in determining financial system stability.
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Institutional macro-prudential policy elicits a number of pertinent questions. These
questions relate to concerns about the appropriate institutional framework for
implementing macro-prudential policy, the level of interaction of a macroprudential policy with other policies, especially, monetary policy, and the
optimisation of the relationship between mone tary and macro-prudential policy
and the point of inflexion at which interaction is maximised.
This paper makes a bold attempt to examine some of these issues within the narrow
context of monetary policy. Following this introduction, Section 2 examines some
conceptual issues including the institutional framework for monetary and macroprudential policy. Section 3 discusses the objectives and instruments of monetary
and macro-prudential policy including indicators of systemic risk, while Section 4
examines at the interaction of macro-prudential with monetary policy and how this
could be enhanced. In Section 5, the experiences of other countries with macroprudential regulation are presented and lessons drawn for Nigeria. Section 6
concludes the paper and provides insights for an effective macro-prudential policy
framework for Nigeria.
II.

Conceptual Issues and Institutional Framework for Monetary Policy and
Macro-Prudential Regulation
11.1
Some Conceptual Issues
Monetary and macro-prudential policies are an integral part of the macroeconomic
and financial system management framework. The task involves a delicate mix of
policies with significant overlaps. Since the objectives are not mutually exclusive,
substantial conflicts exist as well as complementarities, requiring close coordination
and collaborations with other stabilisation policies.

The task of regulating the financial system to ensure its safety, soundness and viability
has always been done within a micro-prudential framework in which financial
stability is seen as the sum of the health of individual institutions. However, the global
financial crisis revealed the inadequacy of this approach to financial stability. The
key weakness of the existing supervisory framework is that it is largely micro-static
(Crockett (2000); Borio (2003) and uses a partial-equilibrium framework to regulate
individual financial institutions to prevent their costly failure. In contrast, macroprudential regulation recognizes the importance of general-equilibrium effects, and
seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole. Macro-prudential policy is,
therefore, the approach to financial regulation aimed at mitigating the systemic risk
within the financial system. The consensus around this view is that the overarching
orientation of financia l regulation should tilt towards the financial system as a whole
and not just the well-being of individual institutions.
11.2 Institutional Frameworks for Monetary Policy
Model 1: Full and complete responsib ility lies with the central bank which sets the
policy rate, targets and independently chooses the instruments.

-- - -

------
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Model 2: Responsibility is shared with the fiscal authority, but the central bank carries

out operations - jointly sets targets and consult on policy rate and choice of
instrument.
11.3 Institutional Framework for Macro-Prudential Policy

To be effective, macro-prudential policy should be anchored on a well-developed
institutional framework with specific mandate and structures for accountability.
Authority must also be provided with adequate incentives to enable an a lignment of
the macro-prudential instruments and objectives.
Three essential characteristics of macro-prudential policy are particularly critical in
defining the institutional mandate . Firstly, Macro-prudential measures for fighting
cyclical risks are unpopular and likely to meet resistance from the market. Since
macro-prudential regulation suffers from "inaction bias" stemming from the hig h cost
of macro-prudential measures, the benefits of such measures can only b e observed
in the long-run and may not be apparent.
Secondly, macro-prudential regulations must operate a longside o ther policies such
as micro-prudential, monetary and fisca l policies. There is need for coordination and
cooperation among the different institutions responsib le for these policies,
particularly in areas of information sharing. The macro-prudentia l a uthorities also
need powers to collect data from both financial and non-financial institutio ns a nd to
designate certain institutions as systemically important a nd subject them to
additional macro-prudential scrutiny.
Thirdly, the recent financial crisis highlighted concerns about the capacity o f centra l
banks to adequately monitor a ll the different risk components w ithin the economy, in
particular when bank subsidiaries, products and functions cut across the entire
spectrum of financial services, with some outside the regulatory p urview of the
central bank. Consequently in some jurisdictions, the scope of banking operations
was reviewed and scaled down to core banking functions.
In the post-crisis era, emphasis has shifted to stronger coordination and cooperation
amongst regulators across the financial services. As a result there is a rethink and
review of the regulatory framework for the entire financial sector. This clearly
delineates regulatory domain, coordination areas and mechanisms to facilitate inter
and intra agency, collaboration w ith a view to ensuring effective macro-prudential
regulation. As a consequence of the above, the institutional boundaries between
central banks and other financial regulatory agencies have been remapped.
Besides, several models have e m erged as institutional arrangements for macroprudential policies and regulation vary substantially across countries.
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Table 1
Stylized Models for Macro-Prudential Policy
Features of the Model
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Model 2
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Model 5
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Model 7

The locus of fina ncial regulation
and supervisory func tions and
extent of integration with the
central bank
The ownership of the macro
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Na (Partial' )

Na

Central Bank
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committee

Central Bonk

Multiple
agencies

Multiple agencies

Multiple
agencies

The role of the fiscal authority
and policy in macroprudentiol
policy
The degree to which there is
organizational separation of
decision moking and control
over instruments
Existence of o coordinating
committee tasked with the
coordination o f the institutions
responsible for mocroprudentiol
reoulotion
Examples of specific
model countries/ regions
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Ill. Objectives and Instruments of Monetary and Macro-Prudential Policy
and Indicators of Systemic Risk
Macro-prudential policy requires a stable macroeconomic environment dictated by
a combination of coordinated policies to deliver optimal results (Crockett, 2000; Borio,
2003). Figure l illustrates a coordinated optimal macro-prudential and monetary
policy framework.

Figure 1
Effective Monetary and Prudential Policy Integration
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Macro and micro-prudential supervision differ in terms of their objectives and
trea tment of risk (Borio. 2003). Traditional micro-prudential regulation seeks to
enhance the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, as opposed to
the macro-prudential policy, which focuses on the entire financial system. In microprudential supervision. risk is deemed an exogenous factor because it is assumed that
triggers of financial crises has its origin emanate outside the financial system. In
macro-prudential policy, however. risk is endogenous and derives within the system.
In line with this reasoning. macro-prudential policy addresses the interconnectedness
of individual financial institutions and markets, and their common exposure to risk
factors focusing on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the financial system to engender
stability. Borio (2003) suggested some stylized characterisation of the different nature
of the two perspectives.
Table 2: A Comparison of The Macro and Micro Prudential Regulation
Characteristics

Macro-prudential

Micro-prudential

Proximate Objectives

Limit financial system-wide

Limit distress of individual

distress

institutions

Avoid output gap cost

Consumer

Ultimate Objectives

{investor/depositor}
protection
Dependent on collective

Independent of "individual

behaviour {endogenous}

agent's" behavior

Important

Irrelevant

Calibration of prudential

In terms of system-wide risk,

In terms of risks of individual

controls

i.e. top-down

institutions i.e. bottom-up

Characterization of Risks

Correlation and common
exposure across institutions

Source: Borio (2003).

111.1
Monetary Policy: Objectives and Instruments
Monetary policy is the combination of measures designed to regulate the value,
supply and cost of money in line with the level of economic activity (CBN, 2009).
111.1 .1 Objectives of Monetary Policy
The objectives of monetary policy for most central banks include any or a
combination of price stability (inflation. interest and exchange rotes) ; low
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unemployment; balance of payments viability; and achievement of economic
growth and development. In recent times, however, a good number of central banks
have tended towards price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy.

111.1.2 Instruments of Monetary Policy
The key instruments of monetary policy include: open market sales/purchases of
financial securities; reserve requirements, interest rate adjustments; foreign exchange
market interventions; and discount window operations. Typically, monetary policy is
designed to influence interest rate, exchange rote and its expectations as
intermediate variables, to impact on the ultimate goals of inflation, output or
moderation of the business cycle in general.
111.2

Macro-Prudential Regulation Policy: Objectives and Instruments

111.2.1 Objectives of Macro-Prudential Regulation
There is currently no consensus on the objectives of macro-prudential policy.
However, the general view is that it involves a reduction in the risks and
macroeconomic costs of financial instability. A more explicit rendition is that macroprudential policy moderates systemic risks by explicitly addressing the inter-linked
exposures of financial institutions, and the pro-cyclicality of the financial system
(Caruana, 2010). Thus, macro-prudential regulation is an approach to financial
regulation aimed at mitigating the risk of the financial system as a whole otherwise
called "systemic risk" or the reduction in the accumulation of financial risks, so as to
reduce the probability of a financial crash or mitigate the impact of a crash if it does
occur (Jacome and Nier, 2012) . Following the European Systemic Risk Boord (ESRB) ,
we define systemic risk as the risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential
to hove serious negative consequences for the real economy. An example of such a
disruption is a credit c risis, in which losses suffered by banks and other lenders cause a
curtailment of credit to households and firms that in turn depress overall economic
activity.
Aggregate weaknesses arise when the financial sector as a whole becomes
overexposed to the some risks such as c redit, market or liquidity. Also, the failure of on
individual institution can create systemic risk when it impairs the ability of other
institutions to continue to provide financial services to the economy. Systemic
institutions include not only large banks, but also those institutions that provide critical
payment and insurance services to other financial institutions. All leveraged providers
of credit, regardless of size, are included in the purview of macro-prudential policy
because it is their collective weakness that con affect the provision of credit to the
economy as a whole (Jacome and Nier 2012).
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The intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy ore constructed to address
the time and cross section dimensions of systemic risk. The time dimension deals with
the evolution of aggregate risk in the financial system over time and refers to the
tendency for financial agents to toke excessive risks in economic boom and become
overly risk averse during recessions. This behaviour manifests in the cyclical patterns in
the leverage and maturity mismatch positions in the financial system. The cross section
dimension refers to the distribution of risks across the financial system at any point in
time, i.e. the interconnectedness and resilience of the market structure. Based on
these two dimensions, the following intermediate objectives could be identified:
Figure 2: Objectives and Instruments of Macro-Prudential Regulation
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111.2,2 Instruments of Macro-Prudential Policy
Most macro-prudential policy instruments such a s loan-to-value ratio, dynamic loon
loss provisioning and debt-to-income ratio were designed lo prevent the procyclic olity of the financial system on pivotal assets and liabilities. Other instruments like
counter-cyclical c apital requirement is designed to avoid excessive balance-sheet
shrinka ge from banks in trouble while time-varying reserve requirements is used to
control capitol flows with prudential purposes, espe cially for emerging economies.
Time-varying leverage ratio, cyclically-dependent funding liquidity requirements,
Foreign Exchange (FX) reserve requirements, and currency mismatch ore also in the
policy toolbox.
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Instruments to prevent the accumulation of excessive short-term debt include:
liquidity coverage ratio; liquidity risk charges that penalize short-term funding; capitol
requirement surcharges proportional to size of maturity mismatch; minimum haircut
requirements on asset-bocked securities; limits on open foreign exchange positions;
and constraints on the type of foreign currency assets. To ensure the resilience of the
infrastructure of the financial system, concentration limits and c hanges in sectoral risk
weights ore used.
Using Dynamic Capital Buffer, financial institutions ore required by regulators to
maintain a certain amount of capitol (normally equity and retained profits) to enable
them absorb losses on loons or securities. They ore further required to odd to their
capitol when there ore signs of unusually strong credit growth or when there ore signs
of a credit-driven asset price boom.
Under Variation in Sectoral Risk Weights, regulators compel systemically important
financial institutions to odd capitol to cover new loons in sectors that ore building up
excessive risks. For example, Turkey recently increased requirements for new lending
to households to stem high loon growth in that segment.
Dynamic Provisions require banks to set aside money to cover loon losses when
credit losses ore relatively low to position bank balance sheets to absorb losses that
build during downturns. A dynamic provisioning regime was introduced in Spain in
2000 and more recently in Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay (Jacome and Nier,
2012).
Measures Targeted at Foreign Currency Lending ore designed to mitigate the
negative impact of currency appreciation on foreign loons to unprotected
customers. The danger of a rise in foreign currency value heightens credit risk for
lenders because repayment becomes more expensive. Macro-prudential measures
to reduce these risks include portfolio limits on foreign currency lending and other
targeted restrictions, such as requiring more capitol and tighter loon-to-value and
debt-to-income ratios for foreign currency loons.
Liquidity Requirements ore especially useful when funding is easy to obtain, on
increase in required buffers of liquid assets (those that con be easily and quickly
converted to cash) provides cash reserves that con be drown on when funding dries
up. New Zealand and Korea, rec ently introduced such measures
Loan to Value and Debt Service to Income ceilings ore very handy when monetary

policy is tight. Administrative rules that limit bank lending such as cops on loon-to-
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value ratios and debt service to income ratios ore added to traditional tools in
banking regulation.
Leverage ceilings: ore designed to limit asset growth by tying bank assets to equity.
The rationale for a leverage cop rests on the role of bank capital as a constraint on
new lending rather than the Basel approach of bank capitol as a buffer against loss.
Korea's leverage maxima on bank foreign exchange derivative positions introduced
in June 2010 is aimed at limiting the practice of banks hedging forward dollar positions
with carry trade positions in Korean won funded with short-term US dollar debt (Shin,
2011).
Levy on Non-core Liabilities is designed to mitigate pricing distortions that cause

excessive asset growth. The stock of non-core liabilities reflects the stage of the
financial cycle and the extent of under-priced risk in the financial system. The
financial stability contribution recommended by the IMF in its report on the bank levy
to the G20 leaders is an example of such a corrective tax (Shin, 2011). The levy on noncore liabilities hos many desirable features because the base varies over the financial
cycle. The levy bites hardest during the boom when non-core liabilities ore large and it
hos properties of an automatic stabiliser even if the tax rote remains constant over
time (Shin, 201 l ).
Systemically Important Financial Institutions

Authorities need to be in a position to address the risk of failure of individual
systemically important financial institutions. Most tools currently under consideration
in this regard ore designed to reduce the likelihood of failure of institutions that ore too
important to foil. The Financial Stability Boord, on international body of regulators set
up in 2009, recently announced that a number of financial institutions important to the
global economy - mainly banks and large investment banks with worldwide
operations - would be subjected to additional capitol requirements commensurate
with the level of risk the institutions pose to the global financial system. While these
additional capitol requirements would assist in restraining the growth of such
institutions and better prepare them to absorb losses, additional tools to ease the
impact of failure of individual systemic institutions would also help (Jacome and Nier,
2012).

111.3
Indicators of Systemic Risk in a Macro-Prudential Policy Framework
In order to measure systemic risk, macro-prudential regulation relies on several
indicators. As mentioned in Borio (2003), on important distinction is mode between
measuring contributions to risk of individual institutions (the cross-sectional dimension)
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and measuring the pro-cyclicality of systemic risk through times. The cross-sectional
dimension of risk can be monitored by tracking bala nce sheet information, total assets
by their composition. liability (financial accounting) and capital structure-as well as
the value of the institutions' trading securities and securities available for sale.
Additionally, other sophisticated financial tools and models have been developed to
assess the interconnectedness across intermediarie s and each institution's
contribution to systemic.
The time dimension refers to the evolution of aggregate risk in the financial system over
time. It deals with the tendency of financial agents to assume excessive risk in the
upswing and then to become overly risk averse in the downswing. This reveals itself in
cyclical patterns in the leverage and maturity mismatch in the financial system such
as the credit and liquidity cycles. To address the time dimension of risk. a wide set of
variables are typically used. for instance: ratio of credit to GDP. real asset prices. ratio
of non-core to core liabilities of the banking sector, and monetary aggregates. Some
early warning indicators have been developed encompassing these and other
p ieces o f financial data (Borio a nd Drehmann. 2009). Furthermore. macro stress tests
were employed to identify vulnerabilities in the wake of identified build-up of risky
assets and portfolios.

IV. Interaction between Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Regulation
The primary objective of monetary policy is price stability while that of macroprudential policy is financial stability. In recognition of their close linkages and
interdependencies. some central banks are enabled by law to pursue and achieve
both objectives. Even in jurisdictions where other agencies have statutory
responsibility for financial stability like the United Kingdom, close collaboration and
coordination between the regulatory institutions is imperative~
Given the conflicting objectives of monetary and macro-prudential policy, there are
two sides to the relationship:
( 1) A mutually reinforcing relationship in which monetary policy sets the overall
conditions for demand and supply of credit and other assets wherein lies a major
source of financial system vulnerabilities. and macro-prudential policy facilitates
financial system stability and improves the transmission of monetary policy impulses
and;

The current interest in mo cro•prud entiol regulation actually stemmed from the recognition that o regula tory gop-no
particular authority hod responsibility for monitoring ond managing systemic risks-contributed s,gnif,contty to the recent
wove of financial crises.
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(2) An independent pursuits of price stability through monetary policy and financial
stability using macro-prudential policy resulting in conflicting actions that weakens or
prevent the realization of either of the objectives.
IV.1
The Economy's Loss Function4
Thinking in terms of an economy's loss function enables us to demonstrate the nexus
between monetary and macro-prudential policy. Consider a loss function in which
price stability and financial stability measures are the key variables, respectively as
the rate of inflation (n) and a composite index of financial soundness (s). Our loss
function may be stated as:

Where: a and o are weights attached to financia l stability and price stability,
respectively, ands* and n * are the corresponding targets or desired levels.
Macroeconomic management is about minimising the deviations of both variables
from their targets. That is using macro-prudential policies to minimise (s - s*) and
monetary policy to minimise (n - n*). The core issues include:
l.

Minimising either (s - s*) or (n - n*) contributes to moderating cyclical
fluctuations and so both policies must overlap in terms of the variables they
influence-interest rate, liquidity, credit, asset prices-opportunity for synergy in
which both macro-prudential policy and monetary policy seek to minimise a
common loss function

2.

The weighting of the objectives, however, does matter. The overall loss is a sum
of two minimums and so if objectives differ, but ultimate goals coincide,
conflict may result leading to sub-optimal results. The loss function cannot be
optimised if weights do not add up to one . This is possible if; either
independent agencies are responsible or two non- cooperative units of the
same agency are separately responsible. The reason is simple; each sets its
own agenda and policy recommendations taking the other as given-the
weights will not add up to one.

4 A loss function is a disuti, ty function of policymakers which typicolly contoins the squared deviolion between lhe actual and

des,red value o f each torgel variable mulliplied by a we1ghl ossocioled wilh lhot variab le (Moyer, 2003)
5 We lhink of this loss funclion as a compos,le one for on economy drow,ng from lwo seporole ones - a monetory loss func lion in
which a central bank seeks to minimize lhe deviations of inflation and output from their targets and a mocro-p<udentiol loss
function in which the financial stobilily outhorily (which could also be a central bank) seeks lo m inimize dev,olions between a
measure of financial soundness and aulpul from !heir lorgets. The economy's loss function approximates both

-

-- ----
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The third relates to the choice of instruments-this presents potentially both
opportunity for synergy and conflict. Let us consider the use of capital buffer
as an instrument of macro-prudential policy. During a credit boom, this
instrument may be deployed as a countercyclical safeguard against a
possible burst. It works in two ways: ( 1) raising additional capital is costly and
the transfer of such cost should moderate demand for credit thereby
moderating accumulation of assets by financial institutions and; (2) should a
burst occur, financial institutions would be able to absorb losses. Now, if the
dep loyment of this instrument coincides with a period of tight monetary
policy, then it works for both. Likewise, by setting interest rates {discount
window operations). mone tary policy can alter liquidity conditions that may
work for the financial stability or against it depending on the direction and
the orientation of macro-prudential policy. An alternative scenario results in
a conflict of interest.

4.

Sources of deviations overlap. For example. excessive build-up of assets
(credit) leads to the composite index of financial stability (s) deviating from its
target (s*). Likewise, excessive credit creation leads to overheating money
supply expands and more inflation results leading to higher deviation
between inflation (n) and its targets (n*) .

5.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the stability of
the financial system , which in a bilateral sense, d epends on monetary or
macroeconomic stability. This summarises the case for c lose coordination of
both monetary and macro prudential policy.

IV.2 Models of Interaction
Monetary policy and macro-prudential policy are closely linked to other stabilization
policies in terms of their objectives, instruments. transmission mechanism, ultimate
goals and sources of shocks. Regardless, this close connectedness as a double
edged sword can be a basis for synergy or a recipe for conflict. Two models o f
interaction are considered here viz: a cooperative solution and a non-cooperative
game.

IV.2.1 The Cooperative Solution Model
This reformulates the problem o f optimal interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy in terms of the minimisation of a common loss function where both
policies aim to generate an anti-cyclical shield. Macro-prudential policy tends to
take a preventive course while monetary policy assumes greater corrective stance.
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In times of a financial crisis, for example a negative shock to the supply of loans,
monetary policy come s handy under a cooperative game through me asures such as
reduction in bank reserves, policy rate, and establishment of a special discount
operation and repurchase of financial securities. At such times, most macroprudential instruments, e specially those that are crisis preventive, like capital buffers
(or any form o f countercyclical capital requirements) or Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) can
no longer be freshly deployed. By lowering, capital requirements, macro-prudential
policy can insulate economic growth by averting deleveraging. In normal times,
however, macro-prudential policy plays a nominal role.
The prosp ective orientation o f macro-prudential policy also compliments monetary
policy such that adjustments in normal times when the economic cycle is driven by
supply shocks may be possible without jeopardising the price stability objective. The
basis for complementarity under the cooperative solution is the pursuit of a 'common
objective' represented by the economy's loss function. Information sharing and policy
coherence are two indispensable elements. This approach yields optimal solution to
the minimisation problem.

IV.2.2 The Non-cooperative Model
This formulates the problem in terms of two independent actors, both seeking to find a
solution to the minimisation problem independently. The two are not necessarily in a
competitive or zero-sum styled game, yet, since they do not cooperate, each takes
the others actions simply as given and proceeds to optimise its own narrow objective
function. It is observed that lack of cooperation between agencies could increase
the volatility of policy instruments. Monetary policy continues to focus on price stability
ignoring the consequences for financial stability even in the face of a financial shock.
By pushing in opposing directions, policy instruments like interest rate in the case of
monetary policy and c apital requirements in the case of macro-prudential policy
become excessively volatile. This volatility of tools leads to a crisis and prevents an
optimal solution to the minimization of the economy's loss function.

IV.3

Interaction with Other Stabilisation Policies

The use of macro-prudential policy raises the question of how the instruments relate
with other stabilization policies such as the micro-prudential, fisca l and monetary
policies that impact on financial stability. Countercyclical macro-prudential policy is
linked to other policies that moderate cyclical fluctuations, particularly monetary
policy, which bears on such macro-prudential variables as asset prices and credit.
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Since macro-prudential policy hos direct or indirect effects on these variables, it
influences the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Under this perspective,
the key question is the extent of complementarity between the two policies and
whether the likely interactions between these policies create risks of conflicts in the
pursuit of price and financial stability.
However. as both policies ultimately affect the availability and cost of funds, they con
also be viewed as substitutes. In particular, it con be shown that interest rotes and
macro-pruden tial tools may both be adjusted to deal with the same
macroeconomic or financial shock-for instance, the authorities con raise interest
rates or reserve requirements. How much interest rates and macro-prudential
instruments would be used would depend in part on the extent to which
macroeconomic and financial stability considerations coincide, and the relative
effectiveness of these instruments.
A typical example of a conflicting impact would be a situation in which an asset
bubble hos been identified, while there are strong risks to price stability on the
downside. In other words, supply and demand are misaligned in both the credit
markets and real economy, in opposite directions. In that case, macro-prudential
policy should aim at restricting credit and liquidity growth, but this could lead to an
undesired contraction in aggregate output, and to increased downside risks to price
stability. The macro-prudential policy would then contribute positively to meet the
financial stability objective, but would have an adverse impact on the price stability
objective, calling for a policy response, possibly a loosening of the monetary policy
stance. Such a loosening of monetary policy, however, may hove an adverse impact
on the financial stability objective. Lower interest rotes could indeed contribute to the
build-up of financial imbalances via the so-called 'risk toking' channel. Simply put,
very low interest rotes may create incentives, for banks, to take on more risk, through
the interplay of various channels including asset substitution, pro-cyclical leverage
and risk shifting, when banks operate under asymmetric information. Lower interest
rates may also contribute to excessive credit growth, with the resulting creation of
asset price bubbles.
Lower interest rate leads investors to perceive banks as comparatively less risky and in
particular, imply lower credit standards including credit availability to customers who
are perceived as representing a higher credit risk. When the regulatory environment is
not transparent, a decrease in the level of real interest rote increases banks' risk-taking
behaviour, partly because it may facilitate the underpricing of risks which is typical
when asset prices rise.
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In general, the effe ctiveness of macro-prudential tools may vary depending on the
circumstances in which they are implemented. When the consumer price index
(CPI) and asse t prices move in the same direction. it is likely that the stance of both
monetary and macro-prudential policy would be mutually reinforcing to re store
both price and asset market stability. On the other hand, when movements of
consumer and asset prices diverge, the two policies become conflicting. In
particular, the conflict between the two policies appears to be more severe if rising
consumer prices are accompanied by stagnation in the asset market, as shown by
the experiences of some countries during the recent global financial crisis.
From Figure 3, it can be shown that the three policies are not orthogonal but when
properly coordinated can complement each other for the maintenance of
macroeconomic stability. The three policies have their ultimate objective as
macroeconomic stability. In that sense, there is a greement on objective. Sound
monetary and micro-prudential policy can ensure monetary stability but not the
ultimate objective. In the same way, sound macro-prudential and monetary policy
only ensures countercyclical resilience but not the ultimate objective. Only wellcoordinated set of the three policy measures ensure the attainment of the ultimate
objective of macroeconomic stability.

Monetary Policy

Macro-prudential Policy

Finoncial Stability

Micro-prudential Policy
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The likelihood of an interaction between macro-prudential and monetary policy
originates from the focus of macro-prudential policy-on monetary and financial
institutions. These institutions are the central banks' counterparts in their provision of
liquidity to the economy and play key roles in the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
More importantly, most of the counter-cyclical macro-prudential
instruments work through changes in the availability of c redit and are akin to reserve
requirements. That is, macro-prudential tools operate through effects on bank
lending given that changes in bank loans cause investment and consumer spending
to change.
Table 3: Macro- Prudential Instruments and Monetary Policy Transmission Channels
Vulnerabifrty

financial System component

Leverage

Bank/Deposit
taker

Balance sheet

Lending
contract

Nan-bank ,nvestor
Securities market

Envisaged macroprudential Instrument

..
..
..
.

Transmission
channels
Bonk lending
Brood credit
Balance sheet

.

Capital ratio
Risk weights
Provisioning
Profit distribution
restrictions
Credit arawth coo
LTV cop
Debt service/income
cop
Moturilvcon

.

Margin/haircut limits

Collateral

Liquid ty/reserve
requirements
FX lending restrictions
Currency mismatch limit
Onen FX nnsition limit
Valuation rules

Bonk lending
Balance sheet

BonK tending

Financial infrastructure
Liquidity or market risk

Bank/Deposit
taker

Balance sheet

Lending
contract
Non-bank ,n,estor

Securities market

Financial infrastructure
Inter-connectedness

Bonk/Deposit
taker

Balance sheet

.
..
..
.
.
.
.

Balance sheet
Collateral

Loca11 currency or FX
reserve requirements

Balance sheet

Central banks" balance
sheet operations

Collateral
Portfolio

Exchange trading
Capital surcharge for
SIFls

Bonk lending

Centro' counterporty

Interest rote

Lending
contract
Nan-bank investor
Securities market
Fnonciol infrastructure

.
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Country Experiences with Macro- Prudential Regulation

In the US, the Financial Regulation Bill, created a new Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC), independent of the Federal Reserve, headed by the Treasury
Secretary. The FSOC is in charge of identifying, monitoring and addressing systemic
risks posed by large and complex financial firms, and of making recommendations to
regulators. It is also tasked with responsibility for monitoring domestic and
international regulatory proposals, facilitating information-sharing among financial
services regulators. designating non-bank financial companies as systemically
important. and providing recommendations to the Federal Reserve Board on
prudential standards (Beau etal.. 2012).
In the UK. following the failure of the tripartite regulatory system. the authorities
transferred operational responsibility for prudential regulation from the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) to a new subsidiary of the Bank of England. In addition, a new
Financial Policy Committee was created within the Bank of England with the
responsibility for maintaining financial stability. This committee works with similar
international systemically focused bodies such as the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) to coordinate macro-prudential policies. The aim of the reform was to bring
together responsibility for macro and micro-prudential regulation within a single
institution-the Bank of England (Beau et al., 2012).
Following the recommendations of the de Larosiere Committee, the European
Commission created a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in December 20 l Owhich,
like its US counterpart. is independent of the European Central Bank. In contrast,
however, the ESRB is not provided with full control of its macro-prudential tools (Beau
et al., 2012). As in the US, the ESRB is an inter-agency council, independent of the ECB
and only focused on macro- prudential policy. A major difference between the US
and the UK is the lack of effective and autonomous regulatory tools. In effect, the
ESRB would issue warnings and recommendations. The institutional arrangement
which brings together central bank governors and heads of supervision in the EU since
January 2011 should ensure both effective c oordination and information sharing.
In Paraguay. Brazil and South Korea. central banks have established structures for
macro-prudential regulation and supervision, since the global financial crisis. The
Central Bank of Paraguay implemented the payment system project aimed at
minimizing systemic risk. The measures took effec t simultaneously with the migration to
an inflation targeting monetary policy framework under which the efficiency of the
financial system is a key element in optimizing monetary policy (Jorge and Corvalan,
2011).
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Beginning in June 2011, South Korean authorities introduced a sequence of macro
prudential measures aimed at building resilience against vulnerability to capitol
reversals following the associate d disruptions to domestic financial conditions.
Between February 2010 and Morch 2011 , the Banco Central Do Brazil adopted some
macro-prudential tools to achieve financial stability and reduce macroeconomic
uncertainty. The measures were chiefly designed to moderate credit growth i.e.
increase in reserve requirements over demand and time deposits and also of capitol
requirements over Basel II & Ill recommendations. Others were new consumer credit
operations, measures to moderate exchange rote appreciation through FX
interventions and excessive capital inflows e.g. tax on financial operations (Correa,
2012).
Table 4: Loan-to-Value and Debt-to-Income Ceiling in Asia's Emerging Markets
Type of Macro-prudential Instrument

Country Applied

Countercyclical Capital Buffers

China

Countercyclical Provisioning
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV)

China; India
China, Hong Kong SAAR, Korea, Singapore

Limits on Lending to Specific Sectors
Capital Surcharge for SIBs
Liquidity Requirements/Funding
Limits on Currency Mismatches
Loan-to-Deposit Requirements

Korea Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
China, India, Philippines, Singapore
India, Korea, Philippines, Singapore
India, Malaysia, Philippines
China, Korea

Source Coruono (2010)

On the other hand Table 5 shows the adoption of dynamic provisioning by country
and year o f adoption.
Table 5: Dynamic Provisioning in Some Selected Countries

JUNE 2007 (COMMERCIAL)

Jul-00

Nov-08

JUNE 2007 COMMERCIAL

RULE CREDIT (STOCI( ANO GROWTH

RULE GOP

RULES BASES IN 4 INDICATORS

CONTINOUS

DISCREET ON/OFF)

Continuous

SYSTEM BASED

INSTITUTIONS SPECIFIC

INSTITUTION • SPECIFIC

POTENTIAL GOP (S") IMPLICIT MINIMUM IMPLCIT THRESHOLD IN THE
THRESHOLD CHANGE IN GOP GROWTH

PROVISIONING COEFFICIENTS SET BY

FUNDS LIMITS: 10% · 125"

ALSO PLAYS A ROLE

THE AUTHORITIES

YES, GENERIC PROVISION CAN

YES, " PRO CYCLICAL PROVISIONS CAN

DOWNTURN IS SUBJECT TO

INCREASE OR DECREASE

INCREASE OR DECREASE

CONSIDERABLE CONSTRAINTS

THE USE OF PROVISIONS IN THE

GENERAL CAN SMOOTH PPROFJTS IN

GENERAL CAN SMOOTH PROFITS IN THE

THE DOWNTURN

DOWNTURN

DEPENDS ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS,
CREDIT LEVEL, CREDIT GROWTH AND
RISKINESS OF PORTFOLIO
YES 1,. LIMIT)

INDMDUAL
DEPENDS ON SPECIFIC (INDIVIDUAL)
PROVISIONS ANO RISKINESS OF

DEPENDS ON RISKINESS OF PORTFOLIO

PORTFOLIO

NO

YES

Central Bank of, igeria

V.1

Economic and Financial Re,•1ew

Volume 50 4

December 2012

159

Lessons of Macro-Prudential Regulation for Nigeria

The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 locates the mandate of ensuring both price and
financial system stability under the purview of the CBN. This presents an excellent
opportunity for close coordination of monetary and macro-prudential policies and
strengthening the case for a CBN-led framework for macro-prudential regulation in
Nigeria. However, since the c risis, macro-prudential regulation has emerged as a
c ardinal issue in financial stability requiring the establishment of independent
institutional structures with a definite mandate to deliver.
Even though the most recent global economic crisis was triggered by events in the
housing sector, there have been occasions in the past in which financial system
crashes had their origins in monetary developments, due to the failure of monetary
and macro-prudential supervision, in particular, exchange rate management. The
authorities based on existing mandate must front-load macro-prudential regulation
on its agenda and design a framework that takes into account existing institutional
structures for monetary and fiscal policy coordination at policy and institutional
levels. This is especially compelling, given the spread of Nigerian banks offshore.
Systemic liquidity is critical to financial stability, and it is driven mainly by the
monetisation of oil receipts.
Monetary policy therefore ha s a great leverage on ma naging system liquidity which
could have very important consequences on the effectiveness of macro-prudential
policy and for the stability of the financial system. Nigeria obviously needs a financial
stability framework that promotes synergy between macro-prudential policy and
monetary policy.
Table 6: Lessons of financial Stability Framework: Objectives and Tools
Objectives and Tools

Current

Macro-prudential

Micro and MacroPrudential Policy

I

Monetary Polley

Fiscal Polley

Limit Distress of
Individual banks
(micro-prudential)
Quonlity/Quolity of
Capitol
Leverage rolio
Counterporty credit
risk
Strengthen risk
management

Maintain price
stability
Policy role
Standard repos
Interest on reserves
Policy corridors

Manage oggregale
demand
Taxes
Automatic stabilizers
Countercyclical
(discrelionory)
approach

Limit Systemic Risk
(Macro-prudential)
C ountercyclical
capitol change
Forward looking
provisioning
Systemic Capitol
change
Leverage ratio
LTV cops
Robust infrastructure

Leon against booms
Increase policy rote
Raise reserve
requirements
Mop up liquidity
Provide Support on
Downside
Decrease policy rote
lnjecl liquidity
Quontitotive easing
Emergency liquidity
assistance

Build fiscal buffers In
good times
Reduce debt levels
Introduce foxes/levies
on financial sector
Provide Financial Sector
Support in times cl stress
Capital injection
Deposit ond debt
guarantee s
Bonk rescue packages
Discretionary stimulus
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Macro-prudential policy must deploy a range of tools to address systemic weakness
and individual failures. This is because a single tool is unlikely to be sufficient to address
the various sources of systemic risk. The monetary authorities or institutions responsible
for macro-prudentia l regulation must be able to tailor specific macro prudential
instruments to the particular identified vulnerabilities.
Also, macro-prudential policy framework should encompass a system of early
warning indicators that signal increased vulnerabilities to financial stability and a set
of associated policy tools that can address the increased vulnerabilities at an early
stage. Its pursuit would require the macro-prudential authority to adjust policy tools
dynamically, to counter the build-up of risks during upswings and attenuate credit
contraction and excessive risk-aversion in downturns.
VI.
Concluding Remarks
From a macro-prudential view, the overriding goal of financial regulation goes
beyond just protecting insured depositories/investors and maintaining price stability.
The task involves mitigating the fire-sales and credit-crunch effects that can arise as a
consequence of excessive leverage in the financial system. Containing these effects
with just micro-prudential supervision will be difficult. In this paper, we highlighted the
need for macro-prudential framework for financial regulation, the objectives and
instruments required to implement such a framework, pointing out the importance of
policy coordination among the macroeconomic stabilizing policies. Analysis of
country experiences show that different jurisdiction adopt different institutiona l
structure for macroprudential regulation. The lessons for Nigeria include the need for
a counter-cyclical macro-prudential policy which is adequately aligned with microprudential and monetary policies so as to ensure optimal results.
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